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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT IS NOT LIABLE FOR 
CONTEMPT OF COURT UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHEREIN THE PARTIES 
OPERATED PURSUANT TO THEIR OWN 
PROCESS FOR SEVERAL YEARS. 
The Petitioner's Response to Appellant's Argument Point I argues that the finding of 
contempt is supported because of conclusions reached regarding the terms of the original Decree 
of Divorce. Contempt of court does not result from disputes between parties to a divorce or a 
court resolution of such disputes. Rather, contempt of court involves actions having significant 
adverse impacts on the courts in the administration of justice. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines contempt of court as follows: 
Any act which is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or 
obstruct court in administration of justice, or which 
is calculated to lessen its authority or its dignity. 
Committed by a person who does any act in willful 
contravention of its authority or dignity, or tending 
to impede or frustrate the administration of justice, 
or by one who, being under the court's authority as 
a party to a proceeding therein, willfully disobeys 
its lawful orders or fails to comply with an under-
taking which he has given. 
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., West Publishing Co, (1990) p. 319. 
This definition requires willful disobedience to an order. Utah requires intentional 
disobedience. There is not clear and convincing evidence that Respondent intentionally 
disobeyed any court order. 
As pointed out in Appellant's brief, the parties worked for over six years with their 
financial arrangements. These arrangements included Respondent paying Petitioner's taxes 
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totaling more than $21,000.00 not required by the Decree of Divorce. Only after Petitioner 
remarried did she attempt to collect increased child support. She sought the increased past child 
support only after first proceeding with a Petition to Modify seeking higher future child support. 
Petitioner claims that contempt occurred because the Respondent testified that he had not 
complied with aspects of the Court's Order. Respondent testified that he paid the maximum 
amount of child support provided by the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. (R. 352, Trial 
Transcript Pgs. 79-80.) Respondent also testified as to his interpretation that additional amounts 
for clothing and Christmas expenses were part of the child support upon the automatic 
adjustment of child support to the child support guidelines and consequently not payable. (R. 
352, Trial Transcript Pgs. 81-83.) 
Respondent was not in compliance with the Court's Order only once the determinations 
were made as to what was required by the Order. Our system of Courts is established for the 
purpose of resolving disputes. Respondent had bona fide disputes as to the requirements of the 
Court's Order. There is no showing that the Respondent acted in willful or intentional violation 
of any Court Order. 
Commonly, Courts deal in domestic relations cases with so-called "deadbeat dads." 
These parties fail to pay Court ordered support, often move from the jurisdiction, change jobs, 
hide assets or take other actions to avoid payment of obligations. Commonly, these issues are 
raised on numerous occasions with the "deadbeat dad" refusing to comply after repeated 
warnings and/or Court Orders. 
In this case, the Respondent paid child support and alimony monthly without fail. 
Respondent also paid additional amounts for extracurricular lessens and activities for the 
children and paid additional monies exceeding $21,000.00 for Petitioner's taxes. 
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Petitioner claimed a right to recover more for non-school extracurricular activities and 
lessons. (R @ 166.) Petitioner's affidavit in support of her Order to Show Cause failed to 
recognize Respondent's payment of half of these expenses. Petitioner's affidavit also failed to 
recognize the agreement to split these expenses. (R @ 162-163, and 155-156.) 
This case does not involve the intentional violation of an Order as required. Courts are 
open to resolve disputes between parties without this dispute resolution resulting in a finding of 
contempt. The Order of Contempt should be reversed. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER'S ACTIONS, INCLUDING 
STIPULATING TO THE DOCUMENTS TO BE 
PRODUCED, CANNOT BE IGNORED BY 
PETITIONER OR THE TRIAL COURT. 
The Petitioner's Response to Appellant's Argument Point II argues the trial court did not 
disregard the stipulation of the parties nor the law of the case by finding Respondent in contempt 
of court. Petitioner argues that the order was not objected to. This argument is stated to be of 
paramount importance. At the October 16, 2006 hearing, Respondent's counsel raised the issue 
with the following argument: 
MR. RICHARDS: Your Honor, as the Court has 
noted, this matter has been pending for - for some 
time and this matter comes before the Court and 
where basically, there are pending two cross 
petitions for modification of the divorce decree; the 
one was filed by the petitioner and a cross-petition 
filed on behalf of the respondent. 
With prior counsel, we were working 
towards that and in fact the - the petition does not 
talk about the issues that are being brought forward 
today, it talks about - it talks about, in that petition 
of the amount of child support. And there are a 
number of both factual and legal issues that do not 
allow for this matter to be treated or addressed here 
6 
today. I believe it is going to have to go forward to 
a - the trial calendar for that to be worked out. 
One of- (R. 351 October 16, 2006 
Transcript® 10-11.) 
The Court then cut off the argument and began discussing the Court's interpretation of 
the Divorce Decree (R 351, October 16, 2006 Transcript @ 11.) 
Prior to the trial in this matter, the Court requested that the parties submit proposed 
findings to the Court by October 24, 2006. (R. 169.) Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law included Finding of Fact 32 that states: 
32. On March 3, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion for 
Modification of the Decree of Divorce. This 
Petition for Modification sought a change in the 
amount of child support. This petition 
acknowledged in Paragraph 6 that Respondent was 
required to pay $1,000.00 per month as child 
support. The Petitioner did not make any claims for 
other amounts to be due pursuant to the Divorce 
Decree. (R. 171.) 
The issue regarding the stipulation and the pending motions was raised before the trial 
court. 
Petitioner attempts to distinguish InreE.HL 137 P.3d 809 (Utah 2006) by stating the trial 
court's order was not voided in this case. The Supreme Court did not state in In re E.H. id. that 
the rule only applied to specifically voided orders. The rule applies to matters being reopened or 
inconsistent orders being made. 
Petitioner claims the Respondent mischaracterizes the Petitioner's position at the 
October 16, 2006 hearing. As Petitioner has pointed out, Petitioner filed an Order to Show 
Cause in March, 2005 (R. 73.). Petitioner then proceeded to request documents; stipulated as to 
the documents that were required; received the stipulated documents; filed a Motion to Compel 
Discovery that was denied; requested that her legal counsel withdraw from the case; hired new 
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legal counsel; and filed an inconsistent Order to Show Cause. The original Order to Show Cause 
has never been dismissed. 
The issue of providing income verification is the same in both Orders to Show Cause. In 
the Affidavit of Linda Anderson in Support of Order to Show Cause filed in connection with the 
Order to Show Cause filed March 2, 2005, Ms. Anderson states in paragraph 5: 
Respondent has failed to provide to me his income 
verification for the years 2000 through and 
including 2004. On or about January 25, 2005,1 
requested, in writing, that Respondent provide to 
me his income verification. Respondent continues 
to refuse to do so. 
(Rat 64.) 
In the Order to Show Cause filed March 23, 2005, in paragraph 2 request from the Court 
as follows: 
Why Respondent should not be required to 
immediately provide to Petitioner income 
verification for the years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003 and 2004 as provided in the parties' Decree of 
Divorce. 
(Rat 72-73.) 
In the Affidavit of Petitioner in Support of Motion for Order to Show Cause filed 
September 18, 2006 in paragraph 8 the Petitioner states the following: 
My previous attorney attempted to receive 
discovery information regarding Respondent's gross 
receipts, but this was never supplied. I am 
requesting that the Court compel Respondent to 
comply with this information from 1999 to the 
present. My child support should increase 
automatically based upon Respondent's gross 
receipts increase. 
(Rat 161.) 
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Paragraph 3 of the Order to Show Cause filed September 27, 2006 states: 
Why child support should not increase 
automatically based upon Respondent's gross 
yearly receipts and why an order compelling 
discovery should not be issued against the 
Respondent for his failure to comply with previous 
discovery requests. In particular, Respondent must 
provide his gross yearly receipts from 1999 through 
the current date. Petitioner's child support should 
automatically increase consistent with Decree of 
Divorce directives and should not be limited to the 
child support guidelines. 
(Rat 166.) 
Petitioner's argument that different documents are involved between the two Orders is 
obviously incorrect, Petitioner requested documents from 1999 through 2004 in the first 
proceeding. A stipulation was agreed to by the parties and complied with by the Respondent. 
Petitioner's statement that the discovery had not been complied with is incorrect. Counsel for 
the Petitioner even acknowledged that he had seen the documents. At the October 16, 2006 
hearing, Mr. Friel stated: 
Your Honor, I do believe I've seen some of those 
returns Mr. Richards referenced, but even in those 
returns, the critical document that we are looking 
for and the one we asked for today was a document 
showing the gross receipts or gross revenues for Mr. 
Thompson for those years. 
So even though I - 1 have seen some 
documents and they may be what he's referencing 
in the stipulation, there still needs to be, because the 
- the decree is tied to the gross revenues. 
(R at 351, October 16, 2006 Transcript at 4-5.) 
The income tax returns produced pursuant to the stipulation included the exact same 
returns provided in connection with the second Order to Show Cause with the exception of the 
limited number of years involved. 
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The issue involved in both Orders to Show Cause involved the amount of child support. 
The trial court disregarded the stipulation and the proceedings held before Judge Skanchy. 
Petitioner's assertion that these issues are different is simply not correct. 
The trial court, in part, bases its findings on Petitioner's claims that she did not receive 
documents until six days before trial. Respondent was in compliance with the Order of Judge 
Skanchy. The trial court failed to recognize the stipulation and Order of Judge Skanchy. 
POINT IV 
A STATEMENT IN A SETTLEMENT 
NEGOTIATION LETTER IS NOT ADMISSIBLE. 
In Petitioner's Response to Appellant's Argument Point III Petitioner argues that she 
offered the statement to show Respondent's character and credibility and that the Respondent 
had made an open threat against the Petitioner. As explained in the Appellant's brief, Rule 408, 
Utah Rules of Evidence excludes evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise 
negotiations. 
The question asked by Petitioner's counsel had no other basis than the letter itself. The 
question even referred to an "e-mail letter." (R, @ 88, Lines 22-25.) The preceding line of 
questioning related to Respondent's gross receipts. (R. @ 88.) The subsequent questions related 
to extra-curricular activity expenses (R. @ 93). The introduction of the contents of the letter was 
not to address any prior inconsistent statements. The question stood alone as did the answer. 
Consequently the statements were not used to impeach or determine credibility based on other 
statements. 
As explained in the Appellant's brief, the trial court asked the Petitioner questions about 
the letter. Such questions illicited evidence going far beyond credibility or any acceptable basis 
of inquiry. 
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The Court's error in admitting this statement caused prejudice to the Respondent. The 
Court used the statement as a contradiction by the Respondent leading to the trial court 
disregarding the testimony of the Respondent and finding the Respondent not to be credible. 
POINT V 
PETITIONER'S ACTION IN RETAINING OVER 
$21,000.00 FOR PAYMENTS OF TAXES AND 
OTHER ACTIONS EQUITABLY ESTOP HER 
FROM COLLECTING OTHER AMOUNTS. 
In the Petitioner's Response to Appellant's Argument Point IV, Petitioner argues that the 
issue of equitable estoppel is raised for the first time on appeal. Petitioner also argues that 
Petitioner's credibility as determined by the trial court eliminates the elements of equitable 
estoppel. These arguments are not accurate. 
Petitioner cites S.K. and J.K. v. State, 157 P.3d 352 (Utah App. 2007) for the proposition 
that "in order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial court in such 
a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." Respondent doesn't dispute 
this principle. 
The Utah Supreme Court provided even more recent guidance about preserving an issue 
on appeal in Pratt v. Nelson, 578 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Utah 2007). The Court acknowledged that 
three factors determine whether the Court had an opportunity to rule. These factors are: 
1. The issue must be raised in a timely fashion; 
2. The issue must be specifically raised; and 
3. A party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. 
The issue of the payment of taxes being amounts Petitioner is not entitled to retain was 
discussed during oral argument at the October 26, 2006 hearing. First, counsel for Respondent 
argued the following: 
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Now, that includes the 2004 taxes. Now, if there -
if that payment of the taxes is consideration for the 
agreement that there is no increase in the child 
support and the alimony and so forth, then $2,480 
may be payable on that basis, but it is not payable as 
being extracurricular activity and it's not payable as 
being required by the - by the divorce decree. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this, if- if in fact, 
your client claims the payment of the taxes is what 
he took, his portion and Mrs. Anderson then 
released him of the duties of the increases that we 
are talking about and so forth, why did he not pay it 
in 2004 then, if that was his belief? 
MR. RICHARDS: He has not been submitted with 
the tax bill until the order to show cause was filed a 
month ago. (R at 352, Trial Transcript at 136-137.) 
Later in the argument for Respondent, the following is stated: 
... So, if we don't have that agreement that 
everything goes away across the board, as far as 
those increases, then Dr. Thompson is entitled to 
credit for what he paid that was not provided for by 
the divorce decree, and that is the taxes that he has 
paid which are not $21,000.00. So, he is entitled to 
a credit for that; we don't think that's the - the 
correct analysis, if there are other amounts that he is 
supposed to be paying the divorce decree, 
then he's not - or he is entitled to that - that offset, 
or that credit for the taxes that he paid that the 
divorce decree does not require him to be involved 
with... (R at 352, Trial Transcript at 145-146.) 
The issue of equitable estoppel is also raised in the Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law filed on behalf of Respondent October 24, 2006. Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of 
the proposed Conclusions of Law state: 
5. Petitioner, by her representations or her actions 
in agreeing with Respondent about activities and 
lessons for the children; by agreeing that one-half of 
the expenses of nonschool extra-curricular activities 
and lessons would be paid by each party; by 
accepting contributions for her taxes from 
Respondent; and failing to raise any issues for as 
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much as seven years led Respondent to believe he 
had met his support obligations. 
6. Respondent in reliance upon Petitioner's 
representations and actions, changed his position to 
his detriment. 
7. Petitioner is estopped from claiming unpaid 
support. 
In the Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed by Respondent on October 26, 2006, 
Point II addressed estoppel (R. 178-179). The estoppel issue was raised factually and with 
relevant legal authority. The issue was raised specifically even being raised in the Court's 
requested Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Petitioner's argument that 
estoppel was not raised is unfounded. 
Petitioner cites Youngblood v. Auto Owners, 158 P.3d 1088 (Utah 2007) with respect to 
the elements of equitable estoppel. The elements stated in Youngblood are the same as the 
elements cited by the Appellant in his brief. Applying the requirements of Youngblood in this 
case results in concluding that the Petitioner admitted that she approached the Respondent for 
him to pay her taxes. She acted each year by submitting a tax bill to him each year and receiving 
payment from him. Consequently, the YounRblood requirement that there be a statement, 
admission, act or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted exists. The 
claim now asserted by the Petitioner is that there was no agreement for the taxes to be paid in 
lieu of other amounts such as increased child support. This is a position that is inconsistent with 
Petitioner's acceptance of the tax payments. 
The Respondent continued to pay the taxes each year as the tax bill was presented to him. 
If the Respondent were to be required to pay higher child support, Respondent could have 
refused to pay the taxes. Respondent detrimentally relied upon the acts of the Petitioner by 
continuing to pay the taxes. 
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The issue of Petitioner retaining the payment of taxes was raised at the trial court. The 
basis for being equitably estopped from retaining the benefit of these monies remains unchanged 
by the Youngblood decision. Respondent meets the requirements of equitable estoppel. 
POINT VI 
PETITIONER WAIVED HER RIGHTS TO 
COLLECT UNCLAIMED MONIES FROM THE 
RESPONDENT. 
The waiver argument is based on similar circumstances to that of equitable estoppel. The 
issue was raised in the trial court as was the equitable estoppel argument. 
Petitioner's characterization of the facts and circumstances involved in Petitioner's 
waiver of her rights to claim past child support is incorrect. 
One of the Court's findings was that the Petitioner had attempted to enforce the Decree of 
Divorce by setting mediation dates. As noted in Appellant's brief, this finding is clearly 
erroneous because the Petitioner did not attempt by mediation to enforce the Decree until after 
her remarriage in November, 2004. Petitioner specifically testified that the mediation she 
proposed had nothing to do with the prior amounts. Specifically, Petitioner testified as follows: 
When we met - when we first - when I first got 
married, we met in his car, we just met together in a 
mutual place and were just kind of discussing what 
we were going to do. And I had come to him and 
said - he was giving me a check, I think, I - 1 don't 
know for sure, but I think so, my first check in 
November of 2004, he gave me $1,000.00 child 
support. And I said, what do you mean? 'Cause in 
the divorce decree, it's written that child support 
was $1,000.00 and $3,100.00 was alimony. And I 
said no, I mean, what are you doing? And then we 
started - 1 - 1 wanted to negotiate with him. What I 
really wanted to do was take his tax returns, my tax 
returns, go to the mediator and have the mediator 
say this is what it should be, because I didn't think 
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either one of us had the right to say. (R at 352, 
Trial Transcript 55-56.) 
Petitioner relies on the finding that Petitioner had reasonable explanations for waiting to 
enforce the Decree of Divorce. This finding is not sufficient to overcome the Petitioner's 
waiver. Petitioner decided not to pursue past child support. Petitioner continued to accept over 
$21,000 in taxes over a period of years. Petitioner pursued an Order to Show Cause without 
pursuing past child support. These actions constitute an intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. The Court finding that a delay in bringing this action doesn't change the fact the Petitioner 
had waived her rights. 
POINT VII 
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN A PROCEEDING IN 
WHICH RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE 
FOUND IN CONTEMPT. 
Petitioner's Response to Appellant's Argument Point VI argues that the trial court did not 
base the award of attorney's fees on the Decree of Divorce. Paragraph 34 of the Decree of 
Divorce dated April 20, 1999 states: 
If any party should be found to be in contempt in 
any provisions of any order of this court, that party 
shall be responsible for paying reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs for the enforcement 
thereof. (R at 46.) 
As explained throughout this appeal, Respondent challenges the finding of contempt by 
the trial court. The requirements of Paragraph 34 are consequently not met. Petitioner states that 
the Court did not follow the Decree of Divorce in awarding attorney's fees. The Petitioner is 
bound by the Divorce Decree. Petitioner can't claim a different basis for attorney's fees. 
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The Petitioner also points out that the trial court did not require the documentation of 
Petitioner's attorney's fees claimed at the December, 2006 hearing. This is an admission of 
error. As noted in the Appellant's brief, reasonableness and need for the attorney's fees of 
$1,286.89 is in question. This is an additional issue beyond the award of any attorney's fees. 
POINT VIII 
EACH PARTY SHOULD BEAR THEIR OWN 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Petitioner argues that she should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
Fees can be awarded on appeal if properly ordered in the trial court. Here, a finding of contempt 
is not appropriate. Consequently, the Petitioner is not entitled to attorney's fees at the trial court 
level. The requirements of Paragraph 34 of the Decree of Divorce are not met. Petitioner is not 
entitled to fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's Order from Trial Held October 26, 2006 and Objection Hearing held 
December 18, 2006 should be reversed. Respondent should not be held in contempt of court, 
should not be responsible for prior child support, Christmas and clothing funds, taxes for 
Petitioner for tax years after her remarriage, or attorney's fees. If the Order is not reversed, 
Respondent should be credited for amounts paid for Petitioner's taxes against any amounts found 
owing. 
DATED this 7ffi day of August, 2007. 
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES 
. — _ _ , ^-*- i 
Bruce L. Richards / 
Attorney for Respondent 
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